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Preliminary Remarks
J ODO Shinshu has contributed a particularly rich and complex philosophical development to the Pure Land stream of the Buddhist tradition, and the 
work of gaining intellectual clarity about this spiritual path still continues. 
This review article focuses on a collection of papers that was originally the 
focus of a conference held in Berkeley, California, in 1996. The subtitle of 
that volume, “Creating a Shin Buddhist Theology in a Religiously Plural 
World,” suggests that the way in which Pure Land Buddhists have thought 
about their tradition in the past may need to change in encountering other 
religions and in dialoguing with radically different approaches within the 
Buddhist tradition. Here, I will comment on several of the theorists whose 
papers are included in Toward a Contemporary Understanding of Pure Land 
Buddhism, considering their ideas in terms of three categories that I believe 
will represent enduring types of 21st-century approaches to Pure Land 
Buddhist religiosity. One type of approach tries to place the Pure Land stream 
of the Buddhist tradition, and especially the Jodo Shinshu school thereof, in 
comparison and contrast to the Christian tradition. This stance can be seen in 
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the work of John Cobb and John Yokota. Another posture that we will con­
tinue to see throughout this century, tries to understand Shinshu in comparison 
to other schools of Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism. This perspective usu­
ally results in minimizing the uniqueness of those Buddhist approaches which 
derive from the thought of Shinran (1173-1262) and can be seen in the 
papers by Tachikawa Musashi in the aforementioned volume.1 The third type 
of viewpoint, which I expect to be enduring, is one which stresses the expe­
riential nature of Shinshu religiosity and its inseparability from the actual 
practice of the Nembutsu, the saying aloud or reflecting silently upon Amida 
Buddha’s name. This stance can be seen in the work of Dennis Hirota. I will 
also refer to some of my own writings which have appeared elsewhere and 
share a perspective on Jodo Shinshu, which finds it to be concerned with the 
transformative experience that takes place in the process of saying or think­
ing upon Amida’s name.
1 Hirota 2000, pp. 101-24, 223-40.
2 See ibid., pp. 241-47.
My categorization of these approaches differs considerably from that given 
by Dennis Hirota, himself.2 Hirota would highlight modes of understanding 
and the linguistic dimension of Nembutsu practice in assessing his own work. 
Instead, I am more concerned about seeing him as part of a larger movement 
within contemporary Jodo Shinshu thought that is guiding the practicer back 
to practice, that of saying the Buddha’s name, and the spiritually transforma­
tive experience which comes with that practice. It will be obvious that this is 
the approach to Pure Land Buddhism which I consider most fruitful. Although 
this is my own preferred pathway to understanding Shinran and his followers, 
the other two approaches also have their virtues and will, I believe, endure.
Intramural Comparative Buddhism
As Jodo Shinshu continues to become better known outside of Japan, we will 
see more and more applications of a perspective which I call intramural com­
parative Buddhism. By this, I mean an understanding of two or more schools 
of Buddhism from the perspective of thinkers strongly committed to one side 
of the dialogue. Usually, this approach presumes that the goals and supposi­
tions are the same for all schools of Buddhism. Such an assumption is not pre­
sent in much writing by Jodo Shinshu authors. Tachikawa is a particularly 
good example of this approach in that he is broadly informed by Buddhist tra­
dition and has no specific axe to grind. Insiders often do have particular spins 
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we wish to give to the material. When we engage in intramural comparative 
Buddhism, our vested interest often deprives us of the freshness which can 
be found in Tachikawa’s work.
Reservations Regarding Tachikawa Musashi ’s Approach
Tachikawa sees Buddhist understanding of both the mundane world (Skt. 
samvriti-satya', Jp. zokutai IS®) and the sacralized world (Skt. paramartha- 
satya', Jp. shintai MK) as being based on the perspective of dependent origi­
nation (Skt. pratitya-samutpada'. Jp. engi ft/fi)? This concept certainly has 
its importance in Buddhist doctrinal history, but it is not understood by all 
practicing Buddhists nor invoked by all the founders of the two hundred or 
so living schools of Buddhism. In its simplified translation, “interdepen­
dence,” dozens of recent books on the Buddhist religion treat it as founda­
tional. Tachikawa himself, however, admits that, “the details of the teaching 
of dependent origination taught by Sakyamuni himself are not known ex­
actly.”3 4 What grounds are there then for elevating this concept to the status 
of being foundational for all Buddhist thought and practice? It is a short step 
from such foundationalism to the narrowness of fundamentalism as we see in 
conservative Christianity. It may do us well to remember the Buddha as the 
Great Physician who prescribes doctrines and practices as remedies. A rem­
edy or therapy is context-specific and not intended for all persons at all times.
3 See ibid., pp. 105-9.
4 Ibid., p. 106.
5 Ibid., p. 235.
6 On this note, see Hirota 1991.
Using the homogenizing concept of dependent origination to understand 
the thought of Shinran and his followers is particularly procrustean. Shinran 
himself never uses the term in the corpus of his writing. While I respect 
Tachikawa’s intention to situate Shin Buddhism more centrally in the 
Mahayana Buddhist tradition, we cannot put words in Shinran’s mouth. He 
did not treat dependent origination as foundational in the way that Tachikawa 
and many other contemporary buddhologists wish to see it.
Tachikawa’s treatment of Dainichi Nyorai and Amida Buddha as equiva­
lently “personifications of the working of emptiness”5 ignores the fact that 
Shinran uses both the sambhoga-kaya (Jp. hojin Buddha of a glorified 
body) model and the hoben hosshin (Dharma-body of compassionate
means) model to describe Amida.6 In employing the latter model, Shinran is 
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a long way from identifying Amida with the absolute principle with which 
Tachikawa, Cobb and Yokota try to equate him.7 According to the thought of 
Tan-luan ft® (476-542), who innovated the concept in the early sixth cen­
tury, there are innumerable hoben hosshin. Amida Buddha is only one of 
these. With the sambhoga-kaya model, it is even clearer that Amida cannot 
fill the function that the aforementioned three theorists try to assign him. 
Amida as sambhoga-kaya is identical with the process of making and enact­
ing his vows.
7 Both of these latter authors’ perspectives can be found in Hirota 2000. For John B. Cobb 
Jr., seepp. 147-60; for John S. Yokota, see pp. 73-100, pp. 199-221.
8 Hirota 2000, p. 113.
9 For a more detailed discussion of the nature of shinjin, see my article, “Existentializing 
and Radicalizing Shinran’s Teaching by Repositioning it at the Center of Mahayana Tradition,” 
in Tanaka and Nasu 1998, pp. 272-74.
10 Original 1996 conference booklet, p. 147.
Amida is, then, one sambhoga-kaya among innumerable others. Tachikawa 
refers to Amida as a “personification” of emptiness and this term is mislead­
ing at best. “Personification” implies the imposition of a personal nature upon 
a non-personal reality. The ultimate concern for Buddhists, and we may here 
use Tachikawa’s preferred term, emptiness, is a dynamic truth that is intrin­
sically neither personal nor impersonal.
Tachikawa tells us that “In Pure Land faith, however, it is not permitted 
the practicers of religious action to judge for themselves the extent to which 
their goal has been attained.”81 doubt that this even seems to be the case in 
all ten schools of Jodo Shinshu or in the two schools of Jodo Shu. I under­
stand why such an opinion could emerge from studying some authors within 
Hongwanji-ha. Even in this school, however, I would deny that this is so. 
Certainly our ultimate goal is the same as that of other Buddhists, thorough­
going enlightenment. The relevant mediate goal is, however, the receiving of 
shinjin If T'. Shinjin is a sort of faith. Or, we may say that a model of faith is 
one model that clarifies what shinjin is.9 Tachikawa’s earlier draft of his paper 
simply said that it is considered arrogant to assert that one has faith in Amida.10 
Rather than quibble about Tachikawa’s interpretation, I would like to say that 
it is often assumed that there are no Jodo Shinshu Buddhists who have a clear 
knowledge that they have received shinjin. This is not so. I suspect that there 
are hundreds of thousands of Buddhists in this stream of tradition, perhaps 
millions, who know that this moment of profound entrusting has occurred. 
There is wisdom in knowing that one has been given shinjin. But as even this 
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wisdom (chion £□,©) is received from Amida Buddha, there is not necessarily 
any arrogance in acknowledging that one has been so benefited.
Valid Insights Contributed by Tachikawa Musashi
Tachikawa’s definition of ritual as “creating a distinction between the sacred 
and the profane” is cogent. If he were to look closely at the central matter of 
the Pure Land tradition, the Nembutsu, in terms of its being a ritual act which 
brings the practicer in touch with the realm of the sacred, his analysis might 
prove extremely fruitful.11
11 I have explored this possibility to some extent in Gibbs 2001.
12 These models of a person without a soul-thing underlying them have been explored some­
what in Gibbs 1997.
Tachikawa correctly points out the need for the Buddhist religion to estab­
lish an adequate concept of persons. I would suggest an organic model—a 
person actively pulls together various activities and commitments just as a 
body actively unifies subsystems like respiration, blood circulation, etc. I have 
also suggested a narrative model of the person. We are the story that we tell.12 
These two valid insights are indicative of the sort of ground, which may be 
gained by what I call the intramural comparative approach to understanding 
Jodo Shinshu Buddhism.
Christian—Shinshu Dialogue
John Yokota and his long-time mentor, John Cobb, have both taken Christian- 
Shinshu dialogue about as far as it can go along the lines of unifying the two 
traditions. Perhaps the lesson to be learned is that true acceptance in this reli­
giously plural world requires allowing others to be different. It is not fruitful 
to pretend that all the world’s major religions are, at some deep level, the 
same. I am reminded of the situation in Anglo-American philosophizing in 
the mid-sixties. A handful of thinkers, including Ludwig Wittgenstein, John 
Austin, and John Wisdom, had forged an approach that came to be called 
“ordinary-language philosophy.” I cannot see that subsequent authors have 
gone anywhere with their attempts to build on the insights of those thinkers 
in the last forty years.
Many would disagree with what I have said about the linguistic turn in 
Anglo-American philosophy. Even so, I would say the same thing about the 
attempt to unify Buddhism and Christianity that can be seen in the writings 
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of Cobb and Yokota. Someone was bound to try this. Cobb and Yokota have 
done a very professional job of it. For reasons I will explain below, I believe 
that the apparent promise in this approach may not pan out.
Reservations Regarding John B. Cobb Jr. ’s Approach
Cobb believes that Pure Land Buddhists need a “historical embodiment” for 
Amida which parallels the embodiment of Christ in Jesus. This perceived need 
is based on a Christian approach to ontology and history. So far as historical 
embodiments go, Buddhists have numerous exemplars of practice. For 
Shinshu, this would include Shinran, historical teachers, inspiring laypeople 
(not just myokonin W?A), etc. More importantly, our feeling about this mat­
ter as Buddhists is different. The levels of practice and personal experience 
are more central than the matters of ontology and propositional belief. Hirota 
stated in his presentation at the 1996 conference that the problem of involve­
ment in history raised by Cobb has its focus not in Amida as an object of faith 
or as working on the world as object but in Amida’s action (the working of 
the primal vow) as the awareness of the practicer. For a traditional Christian, 
Jesus must have existed and he must have been the Christ. For a Buddhist, 
even a very traditional one, perhaps Sakyamuni was enlightened, perhaps 
there was a renunciant named Dharmakara who fulfilled his vows. For a tra­
ditional Jodo Shinshu Buddhist, perhaps Shinran’s realization was genuine. 
The crucial point for the Shin Buddhist is that something worthy and per­
ceived as reliable is encountered as, e.g., Namo Amida Butsu. Although we 
use narrative language and even appear (in a secondary way) to make claims 
regarding ontological truth, religious experience is central. This is not the case 
for many Christians and Muslims. Those religions really do place the assent 
to ontological truth-claims more central to the process of being one of the 
faithful. In Chapter Two of the Tannisho Shinran is reported to have
said that he wouldn’t care if it turned out that saying the Nembutsu was actu­
ally paving his way to a hellish state of existence. His experience of saying 
the Buddha’s name was still the truest thing he knew and no other practice 
nurtured his spirituality. This is a characteristically Buddhist way of seeing 
things. Practice and experience are central. Veridical theories expressing 
truth-claims are not of the essence of the Buddha-way. If it turned out that it 
had been some demon who had actually taught the sutras on Amida Buddha, 
Shinran would still follow the path of the Nembutsu, and so would I.
Cobb is working with a somewhat rigid and dualistic notion of myth as 
opposed to language that literally describes states of affairs. His notion of his­
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tory does not seem to fit in either of these categories although I am sure it is 
supposed to be a realm of “literal” truths. He opposes the “myth” of Amida 
to some felt need for a historical embodiment. But the Jesus he takes as an 
embodiment of Christ’s/God’s compassion is a thoroughly mythologized 
figure. Cobb tries to make his ontology, his myth and his mythologized “his­
torical” Jesus seem consistent with one another. This is hardly a prohibitively 
difficult task in the absence of any solid knowledge of who the historical 
figure was (Joshua Ben David?) and what exactly he was teaching (New Age 
Judaism?). Cobb notes that Yokota initially focuses on Sakyamuni Buddha as 
a historical embodiment of limitless compassion. Hirota rightly points out that 
the Sakyamuni to whom Yokota refers is a thoroughly mythologized figure 
with no solid basis in fact.
Cobb’s query as to whether or not Buddhists are content with a mythical 
account13 is driven by a correspondence model of truth. In the Russelian for­
mulation, there are states of affairs and our propositions are true when they 
describe the relevant states of affairs accurately. I agree with Paul Ricouer 
that language reveals truth in a variety of ways. Even the Western philosoph­
ical tradition has been consistently distancing itself from a correspondence 
theory of truth for the past century.
13 Hirota 2000, p. 156.
14 Ibid., p. 159.
Cobb suggests that Pure Land Buddhists can “be enriched as they respond 
to questions with which Christians have been wrestling more intensively for 
a longer period of time.”14 But the problem is to identify in just which areas 
Buddhists can learn from Christians and vice versa. It seems to me that Bud­
dhists have been wrestling more intensively and for a longer period of time 
with the question of the nature of language than Christians have. The one area 
where I would be inclined to admit that Christians have been theorizing more 
intensively is the matter of personhood. In the essays in Toward a Contem­
porary Understanding of Pure Land Buddhism, it is not Cobb but Tachikawa 
(a Buddhist) and Gordon Kaufman who address the unique status and worth 
of the individual. On the topic of the relation between mythic-narrative lan­
guage and the function of language to reveal truth, it seems to me that the 
Buddhist tradition is more advanced. Our more fluid and various ways of 
appreciating language help to prevent us from taking the sort of mystified 
view of history that leads Cobb to identify the historical person referred to as 
Jesus with a supposedly obvious exemplar of compassion.
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The status of process thought as representatively Christian is somewhat 
open to question. It seems to me that the views of Cobb are a digression from 
ontological claims for Christ, heaven, etc. as they are found in more tradi­
tional Protestant and Catholic theology. Cobb elaborates new philosophical 
perspectives that are in consonance with only some other contemporary the­
ologies. A problem for me is that if I dialogue with Cobb, Yokota, or similar 
process thinkers, who am I in dialogue with. How many people actually 
ascribe to the sort of take on Christian ideas that they are presenting?
A related issue is raised by Hirota in response to Yokota, “Why Process 
Thought?” I would like to point out that there are something like three hundred 
thousand religious traditions in the world. Process theology is either a newly- 
arisen religion or a new take on some sort of liberal Protestantism. There are 
about two hundred schools each of Buddhism and Christianity active in the 
world today. Why would we want to assert the identity of the ultimate concern 
in one out of the two hundred schools of Buddhism and the ultimate concern 
in one out of the two hundred schools of Christianity?15
15 Here, I am treating the specifically process understanding of Jesus and the Shinshu ver­
sion of Amida as distinct from whom those personages are in other streams of the traditions.
16 Hirota 2000, p. 159.
Valid Insight to Be Drawn from Cobb’s Work
There is only one point in Cobb’s work that interests me as a Buddhist pas­
tor. He states, “An accurate description of experience in a context where grace 
is recognized leads to an increase in its role in the whole experience and to 
alteration of its other aspects.”16 Shinran’s life was filled with experiences of 
finding the “grace” of Amida, if I may for the present refer to it in that fashion, 
in many persons and events. He was able to have such experiences because 
he discerned the presence of Amida’s working in the saying and hearing of 
the Nembutsu. Shinran saw his wife as an embodiment of the Bodhisattva of 
Compassion, Kannon HU, his teacher, Honen (1133-1212), as an em­
bodiment of the Bodhisattva of Wisdom, Daiseishi AS-3E, and perceived a 
statue of Kannon to come alive and give him guidance at Rokkakudo
In contrast to such experiences of recognizing “grace,” for most ministers and 
philosophers of Hongwanji-ha, the experience of Amida’s working remains 
constrained exclusively to the saying and hearing of the Nembutsu. I think 
that we might respond to the challenge by Cobb here and look more seriously 
at, for example, Shinran’s description of the benefits in this life that come 
210
GIBBS: THEMES IN PURE LAND BUDDHISM
from saying the Nembutsu. Benefits that he elaborates include being sur­
rounded and protected by numberless gods, bodhisattvas and buddhas in 
transformation bodies. Such an increase in the role of such “grace” in the 
whole of experience was the reality of our founder’s experience, but has not 
often been remarked upon by others in our tradition over these past seven cen­
turies.
Reservations Concerning the Orientation of Cobb and John Yokota
I agree with one of Hirota’s criticisms, which is that, the Sakyamuni Buddha 
to whom Yokota appeals as a historical embodiment of compassion is thor­
oughly mythologized. The same can be said of Jesus. It is not clear to me at 
what level Cobb and Yokota are speaking. Are they doing ontology? If so, the 
notion of “Amida as the Christ,” which Cobb asserts and which was formerly 
embraced by Yokota, as well, has some problems. First, this seems to be 
voiced in the wrong direction. Wouldn’t it be “Jesus as the Amida?” If what 
is being described is something like an incarnation of an ultimate principle, 
which way we voice this is crucial. Second, both the view of Cobb and the 
revised view of Yokota are tied to specific factual claims regarding historical 
persons. If we search for them as actual historical figures both Jesus and 
Sakyamuni dissolve into myth, legend and hagiography.
The use of Amida Buddha as a principle which might be embodied in Jesus 
or Sakyamuni absolutizes Amida in a way that is inconsistent with Shinran’s 
philosophical works. Shinran’s considered opinion about Amida Buddha is 
that he is a sambhoga-kaya. Shinran also uses the view that Amida is a hoben 
hosshin. In either case, Amida is one amongst numberless persons/modalities 
through which Suchness, or things such as they truly are, works to reintegrate 
us. For the role needed in “Jesus as the X” or “X as the Christ” or even 
“Sakyamuni is an embodiment of X,” the dharma-kaya (Jp. hossho hosshin 
>, Truth body of all Buddhas) would be required, not a sambhoga-kaya 
like Amida. Perhaps Dainichi Nyorai, as understood in esoteric Buddhism, 
could fill this role. Amida Buddha as he is understood in Mahayana Buddhism 
cannot. It seems odd to me that such an absolutized understanding of Amida 
has emerged from Yokota’s thinking in terms of “divine relativity.”
Positive Contribution of Yokota’s Work
John Yokota has addressed the need for new concepts in Pure Land thought, 
for daring speculation, for new theory. There is a willingness to risk censure 
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in the pursuit of truth behind his work which I find admirable. The current 
state of Pure Land Buddhist thought calls for fearless speculation, for radically 
new theorizing, for conceptual structures which are a sharp departure from 
what has already been done.
Experiential, Practice-centric Shinshu
I suspect that some will object that I am just discussing several current authors 
and my categories have no special meaning. I see Tachikawa, Cobb and 
Yokota (whom I have treated together) and Hirota as representing future direc­
tions in Jodo Shinshu theorizing. With Tachikawa and Hirota, what I am 
focusing on in their work may be only certain aspects of their conceptual 
projects. Considering the case at hand, Hirota might well emphasize his focus 
on the linguistic dimension of Shinran’s thought. My categorization of his 
approach as experiential and practice-centric is based on a wish to highlight 
commonalities in his theorizing and that of other authors, perhaps even my 
own. I do not see anyone else working on the specifically language-centric 
nature of Jodo Shinshu.
Reservations about the Work of Dennis Hirota
I feel that Hirota has not fully integrated the suggestion made at the IBS con­
ference in 1996 by Kaufman regarding the intrinsically transcendent nature 
of the person. The discussion by Cobb and Yokota regarding the personal 
nature of the ultimate has perhaps distracted Hirota from the more profound 
insight of Kaufman. Hirota tells us that objectifying thought is the problem. 
But I think that Kaufman has an important point to make when he asserts that 
a person is intrinsically resistant to such objectification. Hirota is rightly sus­
picious of the Protestant emphasis on inwardness, which usually accompanies 
such a stress on the transcendent nature of the person. But a person need not 
be identified with such vague inwardness nor the aspect of subjectivity with 
a decisionism such as one sees in the writings of Sartre. Kaufman’s point was 
deeper and more general than to be limited to some Cartesian reification of 
the thinker. In the background of his remark is the Hegelian vision of sub­
jectivity as the locus of the Universal’s self-knowledge. Hegel tried to elab­
orate a notion of the subject as intersubjective, as manifested in language and 
culture. This was a departure from a claustrophobic European notion of sub­
jectivity which ran from Descartes down to and including the thought of 
Fichte. Without tying ourselves to the specifics of Hegelianism, we might try 
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to develop the discernment that a person is the locus of finding oneself in oth­
erness. Some development along these lines might be possible. Hirota is indi­
cating some tendencies in this direction when he describes truth as a mode of 
perception in which “the transcendent is self-aware from the locus of the prac- 
ticer’s life.”17 In any case, there is more to the idea that the person is intrin­
sically resistant to objectification than Hirota has adequately accounted for in 
my opinion.
17 Ibid., p. 66
18 Ibid., p. 65
19 Ibid., p. 66
20 Ibid.
I feel that Hirota has not yet drawn out the possibly radical implications of 
his imaginative, constructive work. He is in the process of clearly defining 
the essence of Jodo Shinshu. This work is more than just “reconstructive” (as 
Kaufman has labeled it). However, the force his theories may have in terms 
of paring away errors in what he refers to as “the traditional dogmatics” of 
Shinshu is awaiting further clarification.
We need to see more concrete examples of “a coherent and intelligible 
understanding of oneself and the world that ignores neither the historical and 
emotional boundness of the self nor the variety and worth of experience.”18 
One example Hirota has given is Shinran’s simultaneous criticism of the 
authorities that exiled Honen and himself, and the joy of the opportunity to 
spread the Nembutsu teaching to the people in that remote area where he spent 
his exile. We need further concrete examples and detailed speculation as to 
what this might mean in the lives of followers less advanced than Shinran 
himself. The negative moment, “permeability of. . . conceptuality by its own 
inevitable inadequacy,”19 is clearer than how the relative judgments’ worth 
might, in some cases, survive such permeation by inadequacy. What does it 
mean that “conceptuality fused with the transcendence of its horizons and 
dualisms allows for the growth of awareness, which ceases to be repetition of 
prior attachments and becomes genuinely creative activity in the world”?20 
Specific examples from the life of Shinran and other important teachers which 
display this dynamic might help. Are there texts or reports from the experience 
of Pure Land Buddhists which can help us to understand what action from 
such a perspective is like? At the conference, Hirota stated that it is through 
the Name in its character as a linguistic act that integration of one’s ongoing 
existence with true reality (life, light) occurs. He argued that while passions 
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still arise, they are divested of the direction and the driving force of the intel­
lect, which functions instead to disarm them. However, such passions are 
assumedly still major determinants of how an individual acts. Someone needs 
to tell us what living out of such a perspective feels like. Assumedly, it is not 
some passionless decision. What would such natural action be like?
A related question concerns the move from Shinran’s description of shin­
jin as being without “double mindedness” to Hirota’s talk of the collapse of 
the doubled self. Shinran’s texts that are consistent with such a collapse would 
be illuminating. If this is perhaps “imaginative-constructive” work, it would 
seem to indicate that Shinran “means more than he says,” to use a phrase of 
Gadamer’s. Drawing new meaning out of Shinran’s texts might well be seen 
as in keeping with his own principles of imaginative, constructive hermeneu­
tics. Something like this is needed to elicit new meanings from such texts and 
should be explicitly stated. What is the experience of such a person freed from 
a doubled or reified self? Is the person more or less of an individual than 
before? It seems to me that these questions naturally come up. They push us 
toward some more concrete Buddhist notions of the person. Toward the very 
thing that Tachikawa mentioned the Buddhist tradition needs. If we were to 
think of a person on the model of an organism, which actively unifies sub­
systems, would the collapse of the doubled self mean that such active unifi­
cation takes place on a deeper and broader level than that of conscious 
experience, than conscious experience under “the direction and driving force 
of the intellect?”
Hirota should respond to Kaufman’s claim that he too is making “onto­
logical truth-claims.” It should be granted that practice-level discourse is 
more primary in the Buddhist tradition (“Try looking at it like this . . .”). Even 
so, despite a secondary or tertiary status, aren’t ontological truth-claims being 
made in Hirota’s work? Aren’t they implicit in some of Shinran’s statements? 
Hirota, himself, grants that Kaufman “is concerned to note, correctly I think, 
that a recognition of a therapeutic function does not dissolve the problem of 
truth-claims about the world.”21 Without losing the experience-centered 
focus of his theorizing, Hirota might state to what extent such propositional 
content is involved in Buddhist theorizing, or at least his own.
21 Ibid., p. 165.
Related to the preceding problem is Kaufman’s question to Hirota, at the 
original conference, “does Amida work directly for other goals than Enlight­
enment as important in themselves?” There is a very basic concern expressed 
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here which goes beyond the matters of anthropomorphizing Amida and dif­
fering notions of what truth is. Shinran elaborated ten benefits of receiving 
shinjin, the encompassing heart and mind of true entrusting. This list, com­
piled when he was in his early fifties and reiterated when he was in his mid­
eighties, includes the benefit of being protected and cared for by all buddhas.22 
Does such care and protection only pertain to the ultimate goal of Enlighten­
ment?
22 Hirota et al. 1997, vol. l,p. 112.
23 See, for example, Hirota 1993.
24 Hirota et al. 1997, vol. 1, pp. 352-55.
In his incorporation of an interpersonal model, Hirota has not fully clari­
fied a difference between Buddhist and Christian traditions on the matter of 
a personal relationship with the truth and its exemplars. For the Christians, 
Jesus is a person and God is personal. As Hirota has shown in recent writings, 
Shinran works with the sambhoga-kaya model of a person becoming Amida 
Buddha and with a hoben hosshin model of ultimate reality becoming the per­
son Amida.23 As I have mentioned, Amida is not unique in either regard. In 
fact, the need to have a personal relationship with one’s ultimate concern is 
not met exclusively through the person of Amida in Pure Land traditions. The 
incorporation of the Bodhisattva of Compassion, Kannon, into the Pure Land 
tradition can be seen in Shinran’s life history among other places. Amida may 
have been a little too grand to meet Shinran’s need for an interpersonal dimen­
sion to his spirituality. He needed both Shotoku Taishi whom he
considered to be a bodhisattva, and Kannon as more concrete mediators of 
the personal side of Suchness/emptiness. Shinran’s listing as among the ben­
efits of saying the Nembutsu that we are surrounded by and protected by gods, 
buddhas and bodhisattvas at all times is indicative of a broad infusion of per­
sonal contact with the ultimate in the life of the Nembutsu-path traveler.24 
The presence of these aspects of interpersonal religiosity in Shinran’s life are 
perhaps not clear to Cobb and ignored as not central to his own project by 
Yokota. Shinran had innumerable embodiments of the ultimate in his personal 
history. For Shinshu-path travelers to have the same rich experience is as easy 
as following Shinran’s explicit teachings. More attention needs to be paid to 
these two lists of benefits in this life from saying the Nembutsu. Amida is not 
a jealous buddha. There are no jealous buddhas. At the level of the dharma-kaya, 
all buddhas are one. It is a Christian problem of needing a specific incarnation 
of Christ which Cobb and Yokota are, perhaps unconsciously, projecting onto 
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our tradition. Monotheistic commitments color a Christian theologian’s view 
of historical embodiments in ways that make understanding the multiple 
instantiations of non-duality for Buddhists hard for them to appreciate. This 
issue is quite distinct from the question of the degree to which Amida Buddha 
may be said to be a person.
Positive Contributions of Dennis Hirota’s Work
Hirota’s papers accomplish a reintegration of Shinran’s practice-centric 
approach to the Pure Land tradition with the transcendence of practice. It is 
only the latter aspect which has been preserved in most Hongwanji-ha-spon- 
sored philosophizing. The reintegration of the practice-centered orientation 
is made possible by stressing the role of actually saying, hearing and reflect­
ing upon the speech-act of the Nembutsu. Hirota quotes Shinran’s statement, 
“there is no nembutsu separate from shinjin nor is the one moment of shinjin 
separate from the one moment of nembutsu.”25 Only the first half of that 
insight has been clearly preserved in the major denominations of the organized 
religion of Jodo Shinshu Buddhism. Hirota’s work resumes the insight that 
there is no shinjin outside the Nembutsu. The term “practice” is actually com­
plex with many a distinct nuance. In the Buddhist religion, practice is essen­
tially a matter of learning to live a different way, coming to walk through a 
different world, or to perceive the world you are walking through differently. 
Hirota’s work preserves the transcendence of practice as effort toward tran­
scendence from a subjective center, from what is still a practice-centered per­
spective in the broad sense of the term. To understand Shinran we must 
understand, Hirota tells us, “the significance of shinjin in terms of the finality 
of practice in the immediate present.”26 His articles consistently reunite these 
two aspects of Shinran in their inevitable paradoxicality, as practice-centered 
transcendence of practice in the immediate present. Further, he elaborates this 
from a stance which is one of practice-based theorizing, which is itself, essen­
tially, an expression of profound religious experience. The result is an artic­
ulation of Shinran’s vision of the Nembutsu path which is of unprecedented 
power and which is in my opinion quite persuasive.
25 Quoted in Hirota 2000, n. 11, p. 69.
26 Ibid., p. 39.
Hirota has begun a clarification of what is and how it is transformed in the 
individual who receives shinjin along the path of the Nembutsu. Hongwanji- 
ha thinking, at least since the Sango Wakuran ASt.ASL incident in the early 
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19th century, has fostered an understanding of Shinran which involves no 
transformation of the person in this life. This is demonstrably not Shinran’s 
teaching.27 While I have called for a more concrete elaboration of this in the 
reservations expressed above, I am excited by what I have read so far. I think 
a much-needed reform of the Hongwanji-ha scholarly tradition is underway 
as can be seen in the respect Hirota’s work shows for the “variety and worth 
of experience.”
27 See, for example, Hirota et al. 1997, vol. 1, pp. 551, 553.
28 See Unno Taitetsu’s article, “Shin Buddhism in the West,” in Tanaka andNasu 1998, p. 6.
I believe that Hirota has given the most important part of a correct reply to 
Cobb and Yokota ’ s concern with historical embodiments of compassion when 
he stated at the conference that the problem of involvement in history raised 
by Cobb has its focus not in Amida as an object of faith or as working on the 
world as object, but in Amida’s action (the working of the primal vow) as the 
awareness of the practicer. Hirota thus takes the discussion away from a mys­
tified approach to history and brings it back to the religious experience of Pure 
Land Buddhists and the transformation it works in their personal histories.
Concluding Remarks
I am suggesting that the several authors who participated in the 1996 confer­
ence “Toward a Contemporary Understanding of Pure Land Buddhism” may 
be classed in three groups. The title of the first category, “Intramural 
Comparative Buddhism,” is not destined to last but the approach to Shinshu 
I am naming with it is. Scholars like Tachikawa Musashi will continue to 
clarify Shinshu from their own perspective, engaged with a somewhat dif­
ferent stream of Mahayana Buddhism. The work they do will continue to have 
value for those of us firmly rooted in Shinran’s teachings as well as for 
scholars who are not themselves engaged Buddhists.
We cannot escape the tendency that many scholars will have to elaborate 
Shinshu against the backdrop of Christian thought. Alfred Bloom and Unno 
Taitetsu have each expressed reservations about “the recourse to traditions 
other than Shin to explain its basic teachings.”28 It is not possible or even 
desirable to eliminate such tendencies. What we want to see from this group 
of scholars is a more sincere study of Shinshu preceding and continuing along 
with such comparative studies. Really the objections of Bloom and Unno 
might apply to Tachikawa as well as to Cobb and Yokota. I hope that my 
comments above have indicated how valuable Tachikawa’s work is. Both
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Tachikawa and Kaufman, whose work I have not treated here in any detail, 
do us a service by raising the issue of personhood. In the re-worked essays 
Hirota contributed to Toward a Contemporary Understanding of Pure Land 
Buddhism, I think we can see some response to this positive stimulus. In 
Tachikawa’s oral presentation, he remarked that the Nembutsu has negating, 
self-negating and affirming aspects. His recognition of a “self-negating” 
aspect of the Nembutsu is in consonance with Hirota’s conception of the 
Nembutsu as having a formless aspect as well as having form. Perhaps we 
can see a potential for further cross-pollination in these two approaches.
I am recommending especially the experiential and practice-centric ap­
proach to Shinshu, which I see in the work of Hirota. I am also, specifically, 
encouraging a careful reading of his work by anyone who is really concerned 
with the future of Pure Land Buddhist thought. It is the Western paradigm of 
a deductive system of thought which forces Kaufman and Yokota to see 
Hirota’s work as a conservative defense of tradition. I believe that Hirota is, 
rather, approaching Shinran’s texts as dynamic stimuli for religious experi­
ence.
Shinran walked through a world of magic and wonder. Because he encoun­
tered the fundamental mystery in the simple saying of some phrase such as 
“Namanda,” he was able to recognize the acting of that compassionate reality 
in many aspects of his life. This is the goal for those who study Jodo Shinshu 
Buddhism as engaged members of the Nembutsu community.
The crucial matter is to penetrate the obscuring fixedness of doctrine and 
practice, whether old or new, so that we can encounter something mysterious 
and liberating in and as our saying of Amida Buddha’s Name. Transformative 
experience takes place when we sincerely turn to the Nembutsu and allow it 
to work in our lives, formlessly and in verbal forms, in deliberate utterance, 
in nearly spontaneous utterance, and in barely perceptible, sometimes unper­
ceived moments of reverence. For the engaged Buddhist, who also works in 
buddhology, the task is to learn to walk through a realm of wonder with hope 
and kindness in our hearts. For the Shin Buddhist who also reads or creates 
scholarship, our task is to learn and often rediscover the mystery and relia­
bility of living in the light of the Nembutsu.
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